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The Evaluation Semantics for Modal Logics 
 
The purpose of the following is to come to more clarity concerning what entities we need 
commit to in order to provide adequate semantics for modal logics and related logics for e.g. 
counterfactuals. The thesis defended is that we do not need possible worlds as first order 
objects, and certainly not pluralities so utterly implausibly suggested by David Lewis. As 
there is a plethora of points of view to make sense of what “possible worlds” are, e.g. modal 
fictionalism, it seems pertinent to point out certain simplifications that can be made in order to 
avoid some befuddlements which are prone to put philosophical discourse in disrepute. The 
view defended here is that we only need valuation-attributes, which may be regarded as 
properties of propositions (sentences) and, in the quantificational case, also of ordered pairs 
formed from elements of and sets from a given domain of discourse and linguistic items. 
The propositional case: Let Greek letters , ,  stand for formulas in the object 
language of some modal propositional logic. Standardly, a formula  is seen as valid on a 
frame <W,R> iff V(,w)=1 for all models <W,R,V> based on <W,R> and every wW. W is 
thought of as a set of possible worlds, and RW2 is the accessibility relation on W. Instead of 
V(,w)=1, many prefer to write wV. This latter notation suggests that the “possible worlds” 
may be seen as functions from the value assignment V of a modal model to a compounded 
valuation-property wV. This hints that we instead of postulating a set of possible worlds, may 
restrict ourselves to what we call an evaluation frame <E, R>, where the evaluation E is a set 
of valuation-attributes (often we just write valuations) V, V’...  and RE 2 the accessibility 
relation on E. We think of the evaluation frames as our models, and are interested in validity 
relative to various models, i.e. evaluation frames, with various restrictions on R. In order to 
make clear that we are making use of the evaluation semantics and not a standard possible 
worlds semantics we continually use the term “evaluation frame” instead of “model”. 
Notice that what we henceforth think of as valuations in the evaluation semantics can 
neither be identified with possible worlds nor with valuation-assignments (often just called 
valuations) relative to frames. Instead, what we take as valuations in the evaluation semantics 
is rather some sort of hybrid, if you like. 
 
For VE we write V iff  holds according to valuation V. We require: 
 
 V-consistency  If VE then not both V and V 
V-completeness If VE then either V or V 
V-disjunctivity If VE then V() iff V or V 
V-apodicticity If VV then V iff (V’)(VRV’V’) 
 
In the last sentence we used another arrow for the material implication, and a capital Greek  
for the universal quantifier. This is used only occasionally here to underline that we are 
stating this in the metalanguage, and will be relaxed henceforth. 
 
Exercise 1: Given only V-consistency, V-completeness, V-disjunctivity and V-apodicticity:  
a) Show V-conjunctivity, i.e. that for vE, V() iff V and V. b) Show V-negativity, i.e. 
that for VE, V iff not V. c) Show V-distributivity, i.e. that for VE, if V() and V 
then V. d) Show V-hypodicticity1,  i.e. that for VV , V iff there is a V’ such that VRV’ 
and V’. 
                                                 
1
 The term “hypodicticity” is a neologicism; the term is philologically and etymologically reasonable and  has its 
roots in the Greek term  (hypodeixis).  
 
 Result: A fully adequate semantics for modal propositional logics is induced, and soundness 
and completeness considerations carry over with few or none alterations. Restrictions on R 
induce different logics as in standard frameworks. 
The quantificational case: We now let an evaluation-model be a triple <D,E,R>, where 
D is the domain of discourse, E the evaluation and R the accessibility-relation on E. E is again 
a set of valuations V, V’…., but now also on pairs as formed in the following. We assume x, 
y, z, x’, y’, z’, x’’… etc to be our variables and F, G, H,… etc. as predicates. We concentrate 
on the monadic situation. V-consistency, V-completeness, V-disjunctivity and V-apodicticity 
are still maintained as requirements. For dD, we may have V<x,d> or not. If V<x,d>, we 
write V(x)=d, as the relation is assumed to be functional. For a predicate F and D’ a subset of 
D, we may have V<F,D’> or not. Again we write V(F)=D’, as the relation on such pairs is 
again assumed to be functional. For relations, n-tuples are invoked as is standard. If x is a 
variable we write V(x)V’ to signify that V and V’ at most differ in that there is one dD so 
that V<x,d> and not V’<x,d>. We now impose plenist constraints on evaluations:  
 
(1) Variability-plenism: If VE, x is a variable and dD then there is a V’E such that V(x)V’ 
and V’<x,d>.  
(2) Barcan-plenism: V’,V’’(VRV’&V’(x)V’’V’’’(V(x)V’’’&V’’’RV’’)) 
(3) Converse-Barcan-plenism: V’,V’’(V(x)V’&V’RV’’V’’’(VRV’’’&V’’’(x)V’’)) 
 
For monadic atomic formulas of quantified modal logic we have VFx iff there is a dD so 
that V(x)=d and a subset D’ of D so that V(F)=D’, and dD. The n-adic cases and recursive 
clauses are obvious and omitted here. 
 
Result: With the plenist constraints (1), (2) and (3), quantificational modal logics with the 
Barcan formula and its converse are straightforwardly accounted for. Completeness and 
soundness considerations carry over with slight alterations. Barcan-plenism and converse-
Barcan-plenism may be omitted to justify logics as in Kripke’s approach with an underlying 
free logic. The evaluation semantics is precisely as flexible as standard possible worlds 
semantics, and as adequately accounts for modal discourse. Or at least so I argue. 
Philosophical comments: It is obvious that there may be many set theoretic accounts 
of the semantics for modal logics, and I fully agree with Kripke in that there is no 
mathematical substitute for philosophy. However, attention to details is important. The 
evaluation semantics suggests that we indeed only need commit ourselves to properties (or, if 
one prefers to think more extensionally, sets) of sentences (propositions) and such pairs as 
have been invoked to semantically account for modal logics. (This is in deviation from the 
project of accounting for properties and propositions in terms of possible worlds, but that 
project has seemed misguided from its onset.) In the same way as there is no problem in 
accepting the existence of non-instantiated properties as having won 30 Olympic gold medals, 
there seems to be no ontological problem with accepting the existence of valuation-attributes 
which do not valuate propositions in accordance with how things really are. Notice well that 
our valuation-attributes should not be confused with Ersatzworlds as earlier suggested in the 
more philosophically bent literature. Residual perplexities concerning type are shared with 
standard approaches and not discussed here. 
 
